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Commentary

Reflections on Untethered Philosophy,
Settlements, and Nondisclosure Agreements
BY MARJORIE CORMAN AARON

D

uring the innocent ‘80s and ‘90s,
when the alternative dispute resolu
tion movement was younger, and I
was too, I read some, though surely not all, of
the articles opposing the ADR movement for
its encouragement of settlements via courtbased, community, and private dispute resolu
tion processes (mainly mediation).
The most notable of these was Prof.
Owen Fiss’s Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J.
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1073 (1983-1984) (available at https://bit.
ly/2OCJupg). It decries the ADR movement’s
impact on the public, the justice system, the
polity, and sometimes the litigants.
I recall other ADR opposition writ
ers primarily concerned that disadvan
taged or disempowered litigants were
settling for less in mediation than they
might have received at trial. I encoun
tered these writings after a number of years
spent mediating legal disputes and, without
uncertainty or angst, dismissed them as rooted
in philosophy or narratives untethered to reality.
Because philosophy was then, and still is,
far outside my zones of comfort or engage
ment, I made little or no effort to parse what
I suspect were Fiss’s and others’ underlying
objections to settlement. That quick rejection
was based on their failure to describe what I
knew to be litigants’ realities.
Conscience untroubled, I kept mediat
ing and advocating for well-designed dispute
The author is a Professor of Practice and Director,
Center for Practice, at the University of Cincinnati
College of Law. She is the 2019 recipient of the law
school’s Harold C. Schott Scholarship Award, which
annually recognizes outstanding research and scholarly achievement by a faculty member. Her latest book,
“Risk & Rigor:A Lawyer’s Guide to Decision Trees for
Assessing Cases and Advising Clients—published by
DRI Press and available on Amazon (at https://amzn.
to/2SNe5UF) and the Mitchell Hamline School of Law
at (http://bit.ly/2riniTaLw9)—will be featured soon in
an Alternatives’ article by the author.
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resolution processes, and eventually began
teaching students, lawyers, and judges.
Thirtyish years later, the #MeToo move
ment, Stormy Daniels, Trump, Kava
naugh, Alabama, Mueller aftermath,
economic and environmental regu
latory and legislative debacles, with
Bush v. Gore as harbinger, provoke
me to reflect more carefully.
Are private mediated settlements
doing harm? Should they be discouraged or
not encouraged, as opposed to what media
tors and institutionalized ADR do?
We mediate “in the shadow of the law.”
Thus mediators and participants imbue the
legal and political system with some trust. Is
that naïve? Does the law’s shadow guide and
protect us, or does it throw another type of
shade?
My initial call to reflection—call it
rumination—was the much-publicized rev
elations of settlements and nondisclosure
agreements, best known as NDAs, in various
Stormy Daniels-type affairs and #MeToo
cases. So long ago. Not long after that,
we read of former New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg’s NDAs.
I suspect these had a number of us media
tors shifting uncomfortably in our chairs.
Uninitiated friends and colleagues were sur
prised by the idea that wrongdoing would be
shielded and offenders would be free to target
(continued on page 122)
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The Master Mediator
(continued from previous page)
me to offer to my clients online—in-person
and also a mixed mediation, partly in per
son and partly by zoom meetings.

***
Zoom is here to stay.
The virus has done in a few months
what years of proselytizing has failed to do:
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(continued from front page)
yet more victims, while continuing to enjoy
outsized paychecks and professional influence.
Mediators and lawyers had to explain to
family and friends that, yes, private settlements
are normal. And settlement agreements that
restrict public disclosure of their terms are a
routine part of practice and process.
It felt shady, irresponsible, callous,
immoral.
ABSOLUTION AND CAVEATS
So are mediator mea culpas required for pri
vate settlements and nondisclosure terms?
Much reading and reflection has led me
mostly to absolution on the question of private
mediated settlements and their NDAs, with
some caveats and rough, tentative, no-doubt
doomed proposals for exceptions in the public
interest.
Why? Because I strongly suspect that dis
couraging or dampening public or private
ADR’s encouragement of settlements would
not necessarily lead to more trials, but rather,
to more settlements negotiated privately, with
out mediator involvement.
Some theoretical work-arounds—requir
ing litigants to disclose mediated settlements or
prohibiting NDAs in mediated settlements—
would increase pressure for pre-suit, direct
settlement, without mediated involvement.
Though the laudable goal would be more pub
lic knowledge, a perverse consequence is likely
to be greater pressure for pre-suit negotiation
and settlement.
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normalize online mediation and other forms of
dispute resolution as not only a viable option,
but in many instances the first choice.
The widespread use of Zoom and other
online technologies will expand and be inte
grated into the mainstream as just another tool
on another day. Adaptive learning to deal with
the impact that online forums have on human
ization, compassion, empathy, emotions, trust,
rapport, credibility will continue to evolve as
humans adapt to the new normal or continue
to Zoom on an ad hoc basis.

As with any new product or service, inno
vation will be quick and widely spread as
mediators and participants learn from experi
mentation and experience on how to thrive in
the new environment.
The first time I saw or thought of two-way
electronic communications was on Star Trek.
We may think of Zoom as the progeny of Nyota
Uhura who, for so many of us baby boomers
and beyond, was an integral part of the voyage
where no one has gone before.
Go boldly, mediators. Go boldly.

At least in the current regime, the public
has access to the claims filed, even if not their
resolution. Unless NDAs were prohibited for
all legal claims, prohibiting them in mediated
settlements would create greater incentives for
pre-litigation direct settlements. The result
would be less, not more, public awareness of
(alleged) misdeeds.
The settlements between now-President
Trump and Stormy Daniels and other “simi
larly situated” women were reached in law
yer-to-lawyer negotiations. No mediator was
involved.
Obviously, privacy was at least one party’s
main goal—hence the punitive terms for breach
of the NDA and the legal battle to enforce them.
Had the case been mediated after a court filing,
at least the allegations would have been subject
to press and public scrutiny.
Thus, even an optimistic and unrealis
tic policy recommendation regarding NDAs
would have to apply to all NDAs, not just to
mediated or post filing settlements. In short,
NDAs are not an ADR problem, they are a legal
system problem. As a mediator within that
system, I am absolved of personal guilt for the
many nondisclosure provisions contained in all
manner of settlements in my mediation room.
That personal absolution begs the ques
tion: When negotiating settlements where case
facts make the lawyers, mediators, or (some)
parties queasy about fear of future and/or
repeated public harm, should there be a cure or
prophylactic treatment for their nausea?
Remember, that sick feeling doesn’t occur
just in cases about sexual harassment or assault
or politicians’ sexual infidelities. Some may
feel it when negotiating settlements of appar
ently legitimate and possibly endemic race,

disability, gender, and religious discrimination,
of product liability claims, of environmental
hazards. The nausea comes from knowing that
others may suffer serious harm in the future,
harm that could have been avoided, if only the
information were known.
Indeed, as Arizona State University Prof.
Art Hinshaw reminded us in a 2011 piece
on the Indisputably blog, the public interest
is sometimes better served by litigation and
results that include court-enforced orders to
protect citizens’ rights. Art Hinshaw, “Owen
Fiss and Sheriff Joe Arpaio–‘Against Settle
ment,’” Indisputably (Dec. 28, 2011) (available
at https://bit.ly/2OGMcKt).
Using the well-covered dispute between
the infamous Arizona Sheriff Arpaio and the
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Divi
sion, Hinshaw states his inarguably correct
view—to my mind—that the people of Arizona
were far better off with a fully litigated case and
court order, and judicial supervision, than if
the case had been settled in mediation.
Laws intended to protect citizens’ rights
must be applied and enforced. Imagine medi
ating that case and learning much of what was
revealed in court. Wouldn’t and shouldn’t the
mediator feel ill if the parties had been willing
to settle for terms that failed to protect the
public, covered up proof of civil right viola
tions, and potentially improved Arpaio’s or his
buddies’ political chances?
It seems clear that cases such as Arpaio’s
should be subject to the court’s judgment and
full public airing because of the wide and con
sequential public interest at stake.
It would seem that our current legal system
would favor taking such cases to trial and reject
private settlements. Or at least it should be.
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State, municipal, and DOJ attorneys are
referred to as “public interest lawyers” because
they represent the public and are charged
with acting in their client public’s interests.
Indeed, as Prof. Hinshaw suggests in the
article cited above, when the Justice Depart
ment negotiates in such cases, it typically
asks for “pure capitulation, which, according
to the local paper, was the result the 20 other
times when it has targeted law-enforcement
agencies for similar violations.” Ibid.
The same is true for lawyers representing
more specialized citizens advocacy groups.
When their clients’ highest priorities are pub
lic awareness, bringing law and judicial power
to bear against wrongdoers, or creating legal
precedent, these lawyers are unlikely to enter
tain private dispute resolution at all.
And, even if they were to see poten
tial benefit from participating in mediation,
neither these lawyers nor their clients—the
public agency or citizens advocacy groups—
would countenance NDAs in any mediated
settlement.
Even (and only if) we have some faith
in ethical public interest lawyers to prevent
private settlements and NDAs in the next
Arpaio case, we still anticipate queasiness in
cases between private parties where wider or
future harm is predictable.
The plaintiff ’s lawyer in a products liabil
ity case and the manufacturer’s inside counsel
do not prioritize the interests of those not in
the mediation room. Note that Rule 1.6 (b)
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides, in relevant part:

STATES MOVE TO DE-ENFORCE NDAS
Since Stormy Daniels’ entry into public
awareness, many state legislatures have taken
up the issue of nondisclosure agreements.
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Flor
ida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Texas have considered barring NDAs for
employment-related sexual harassment and,
in some instances, workplace discrimination
claims.
Legislation has passed in New York (NY
CLS Gen Oblig. § 5-336), Illinois (820 ILCS
96/1-25), California (Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1001), Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Lab.
& Emp. § 3-715), New Jersey (N.J. Stat.
§10:5-12.7), New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 50-4-36), Tennessee (for Local Education
Agencies, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-131),
Oregon (ORS § 659A.370), Vermont (Sec.
1. 21 V.S.A. § 495h), Virginia (Va. Code
Ann. § 40.1-28.01), and Washington (Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 49.44.210). Rhode Island’s
proposed bill S.B. 2563 is broader but still
limited to the employment context.
Illinois’ Workplace Transparency Act (820
ILCS 96/1-25) makes all unilateral employ
ment-related NDAs void and states strong
requirements for an employment-related NDA
to be considered mutual and enforceable.
New York’s NY CLS Gen Oblig. § 5-336
prohibits confidentiality clauses in con
tracts and agreements entered into by public
agencies. It also prohibits any clause requir
ing parties to such a contract or agree
ment to refrain from disclosing, discussing,
describing or commenting upon its terms.
It exempts claims involving sexual harass
ment nondisclosure agreements if the condi
tion of confidentiality is the complainant’s
preference.

A lawyer may reveal information relating
to the representation of a client to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes nec
essary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm.
Some state Model Rules require disclo
sure under these circumstances, rather than
permitting it. Theoretically then, in a product
liability case, or a case involving environmental
claims, the Model Rules provide cover or create
an obligation to disclose.
History, however, suggests these fail to
operate to protect the public. It may not be
intentional; corporate counsel may be subject
to partisan perception bias and client protest,
not to mention fear of termination. And while

psychological and financial injuries are real in
employment discrimination or harassment,
these don’t seem to be captured by the rule.
Always depending on the circumstances,
here are some options for preventing or miti
gating potential harm from settlements and
NDAs in those cases:
•

Legislation stating the NDAs are unen
forceable as against public policy when the

123

Several states have enacted tax laws that
bar income tax deductions for any settlement
or payment related to sexual harassment or
sexual abuse that is subject to a nondisclosure
agreement.
Unfortunately, it’s noteworthy and dis
turbing that the Arizona legislature’s action
was not to prohibit or limit NDAs in employ
ment-related claims or in contracts with
public agencies, but rather to affirmatively
recognize their legality.
It created a narrow exception only for
victims of sexual misconduct “responding to
a peace officer’s or a prosecutor’s inquiry” and
“making a statement not initiated by that party
in a criminal proceeding.” A.R.S. § 12-720(B).
While generally well-motivated—Ari
zona notwithstanding—most of the state
legislative efforts are aimed at closing the
employment barn door, and mostly target
secrecy of sexual harassment claims. They
entirely fail to address potential public harm
from NDAs in a range of other legal actions.
Some courts have expressed public policy
concerns about NDAs, but most have sought
to balance interests in facilitating settlements
against interests in public access to informa
tion. In general, courts apply basic contract
principles to questions of NDA enforcement,
with an ear to unconscionability, duress,
and coercion. In the civil discovery arena
and in criminal proceedings, however, some
courts have refused to enforce NDAs that
would interfere with other litigants’ ability
to obtain information in support of their
litigated claims or defenses.
—Marjorie Aaron & Federica Romanelli
Aaron, a professor at the University of Cincinnati Law
School, was assisted by Romanelli, a CPR Institute 2020
intern, who is of counsel and a foreign legal consultant
to New York’s Crystal, & Giannoni-Crystal LLC.

•

nondisclosure creates realistic danger of
significant harm to other members of the
public. (See the box above, “States Move to
De-Enforce NDAs.”)
Legislation and amendment of mediator
and attorney professional ethics rules to
require disclosure of the danger of signifi
cant harm to others suggested by reliable
information learned in connection with
(continued on next page)
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the case. It’s arguable that, notwithstand
ing mediator confidentiality obligations, a
lawyer-mediator’s professional responsibil
ity rules would currently require disclosure
to relevant authorities disclosure where the
harm appears to be imminent and extreme.
But any ambiguity on this point is better
resolved.
• Creation of a registry for settlements of
certain types of claims, whether or not
suit was filed, akin to the registries set
up in some states for medical malpractice
settlements.
• Creation of an automatic release from
nondisclosure obligations if and when the
party or an attorney learns that the of
fender engaged in similar offenses against
others prior to or after the settlement,
unless previous offenses were disclosed
only in settlement discussions. (For this
purpose, confidentiality provisions pro
tecting settlement discussions, including
mediation discussions would be, sorry to
state it, trumped.)
• Without waiting for legislative actions, me
diators could include language that releases
or even states the obligation to report be
havior that predicts widespread or future
harm in agreements to mediate, and mediation/dispute resolution organizations
such as JAMS Inc.; Alternatives’ publisher,
the CPR Institute, and the American Arbi
tration Association could include it in their
mediation and arbitration rules, and/or
encourage their panelists to put it in their
agreements.
• Waiver of nondisclosure provisions re
garding a person seeking appointment
or election to public office, or serving
in public office. Such a provision would
bar President Trump, for example, from
invoking the NDAs which he favors as a
business strategy. See Michael Kranish,
“Trump long has relied on nondisclosure
deals to prevent criticism. That strat
egy may be unraveling.” Washington Post
(Aug. 7, 2020) (available at https://bit.
ly/3fDEOdW).
• Judicial approval of any case settlement
that includes nondisclosure terms.
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STEPS COULD
BE TAKEN
Sigh. I offer these recognizing that they will
neither come to pass, nor be seriously enter
tained—not in these times.
Before someone launches a full barrel
attack on any of them, I hereby acknowledge
that some may be flawed, lead to negative
unintended consequences, or at minimum,
would require careful refinement. As long as
there’s no risk of any becoming real, it seems
pointless to undertake that exercise.
Having stated that, my gut suggests that,
in the private sphere, neutrals and provider
organizations could indeed take steps to per
mit, encourage, or even require disclosures
where serious harm would otherwise occur. To
make this happen, we would want thorough
discussion among neutrals and provider orga
nizations, perhaps involving (or convened by)
the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution or the
CPR Institute.
In the public sphere, the last one—judicial
approval of settlements with nondisclosure
language—merits serious consideration. That’s
the rule for class actions and, while judicial
oversight is not a perfect remedy in practice, it
offers some protection to class members. We
are uncomfortable with nondisclosure terms
in cases where they may hide current more
widespread violations and lead to future harm.
Our desire is to protect unknown and potential
class members.
Even if this proposal were worth explor
ing, it still raises a series of practical questions:
Would it only apply to cases in which a suit had
been filed? Would it apply to claims subject
to mandatory arbitration under pre-dispute
agreement? If so, might the unhealthy conse
quence be that the ugliest, most troublesome
cases are settled with nondisclosure language,
but without any court or arbitration filing?
As a matter of professional responsibility,
could lawyers be required to raise concerns
about more widespread future harm to the
public? To what body? Might judicial or
extra-judicial panels be created to review even
privately negotiated settlements of claims that
were never filed, but lawyers were retained?
And: Even if this proposal could be imag
ined, would that encourage disputants to
bypass lawyers altogether? Imagine Har
vey Weinstein negotiating directly with an

accuser, asking her to bury her claim—never to
disclose it—in exchange for money or favors.
Who would have more power? Who protects
the others?
If the accuser breached the private agree
ment, negotiated without counsel, should its
nondisclosure terms be enforceable? If the
accuser was not represented by counsel when
those terms were agreed to, how likely are they
to be fair to her or palatable to the rest of us?

***
Leaving aside this digression into an optimist’s
proposals (“Here’s a problem, can’t we fix
it?!”), I return to original arguments against
settlements in litigated cases and reflections
about mediator/ADR promoter discomfort
prompted by Stormy-#MeToo NDAs.
In cases where privacy is paramount for at
least one party, less ADR may not mean more
public trials but rather, more directly negoti
ated pre-litigation settlements and thus less
public access.
We cannot force people to file suit, but
we surely don’t want to render a decision to
initiate litigation more difficult, given that
pleadings—the names and allegations in the
complaint—are public information.
The potentially harmful consequences of
nondisclosure agreements in private settle
ments are troubling. They are a legal system
problem, however, for which ADR is not to
blame. As a mediator of legal disputes lo these
many years, I am absolved of guilt for the many
settlements, with or without nondisclosure
terms, that have occurred in my mediation
room.

CLARIFICATION
In the July/August 2020 article, “An
Unquestionable Mediation Conflict of
Interest—The MGM Mandalay Bay
Shooting Settlement,” by Art Hinshaw
(38 Alternatives 102 (July/August 2020)
(available at https://bit.ly/2PD706c)), a
word was dropped in a sentence near
the end. It should have read: “The medi
ator’s role as a facilitator, compared to a
decision-maker, has no impact on the
issue of whether there is a conflict.”
Alternatives apologizes for the error.

